Roger Williams University Law Review
Volume 25

Issue 1

Article 3

Winter 2020

Resolving the Circuit Split: Pleading Healthcare Fraud with
Particularity
Tricia L. Forte
Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law,2020

Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Health Law and Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
Forte, Tricia L. (2020) "Resolving the Circuit Split: Pleading Healthcare Fraud with Particularity," Roger
Williams University Law Review: Vol. 25 : Iss. 1 , Article 3.
Available at: https://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR/vol25/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Roger Williams University Law Review by an authorized editor of DOCS@RWU. For more
information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.

Resolving the Circuit Split: Pleading
Healthcare Fraud with Particularity
Tricia L. Forte*
INTRODUCTION

In the 2018 fiscal year, the Department of Justice collected $2.8
billion from settlements and judgments involving fraudulent and
false claims against the government.1 $2.5 billion of that sum was
attributable to fraudulent billing in the healthcare industry.2 The
False Claims Act (FCA) is the government’s primary tool to address
issues of fraudulent and false claims. 3 One of the principal uses of
the FCA is to address false claims submitted to the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) by healthcare providers. 4
The statute grants authority to private citizens, often called
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law,
2020; Suffolk University Sawyer School of Business, Master of Business
Administration, 2009. Visiting Instructor, Providence College, Health Policy
& Management Department. Thank you, Professor Susan Heyman, for your
guidance and thoughtful suggestions throughout the writing process. A special
thank you to my family for their love and encouragement, especially my
husband, Michael, and my son, Mikey. Also, thank you to my mentor, Dr.
Robert B. Hackey, who inspired my love of health policy and encouraged me
through every step of my career.
1. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers
Over $2.8 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2018 (Dec. 21,
2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-28billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2018 [https://perma.cc/ETT4-HL8Q].
2. Id.
3. Martin Merritt & Rachel V. Rose, Pleading “Healthcare Fraud and
Abuse” Under the False Claims Act, 60 FED. LAW., May 2013, at 62, 63.
4. Sara A. Smoter, Note, Relaxing Rule 9(b): Why False Claims Act
Relators Should Be Held to a Flexible Pleading Standard, 66 CASE WESTERN
RES. L. REV. 235, 238 (2015).
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relators (or whistleblowers), to file qui tam claims reporting
attempts to defraud the government.5 Qui tam claims account for
the majority of FCA litigation. 6 Such claims, however, are often
difficult to plead because they are subject to the heightened
pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (FRCP). 7
There is a circuit split regarding pleading standards under
Rule 9(b) which has resulted in different outcomes depending on
where the suit is brought as to whether the case is allowed to
proceed. 8 Notably, the First, 9 Fourth 10 and Eleventh Circuits 11
apply a strict standard for qui tam claims, while other circuits apply
a more lenient standard. 12 Courts in circuits that dismiss these qui
tam actions before even preliminary discovery can occur may be
depriving the government of recovery of funds. Dismissal of claims
prior to discovery is contradictory to public policy as the
government, through CMS, is meant to pay only medical claims
that are legitimate and necessary. By denying the potential for
recoupment of these funds, the government is wastefully spending
resources to pay for healthcare that is either not needed or that
never even occurred. CMS states, “[a]lthough no precise measure
of health care fraud exists, those who exploit federal health care
programs can cost taxpayers billions of dollars while putting
beneficiaries’ health and welfare at risk.” 13 If a provider bills for
services that were never provided or “up-codes” services by billing
at an inflated rate, taxpayers suffer monetarily. A more egregious
situation occurs if a provider is overutilizing care, resulting in a
5. Id. at 238, 238 n.12; Merritt & Rose, supra note 3, at 63.
6. Merritt & Rose, supra note 3, at 63.
7. Id. at 63–64.
8. Smoter, supra note 4, at 241.
9. Id. at 243–44, 244 n.47; e.g., United States ex rel. Ge v. Takeda Pharm.
Co., 737 F.3d 116, 123 (1st Cir. 2004).
10. Smoter, supra note 4, at 243; e.g., United States ex rel. Nathan v.
Takeda Pharm. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 457–58 (4th Cir. 2013).
11. Smoter, supra note 4, at 241–43, 242 n.35; e.g., United States ex rel.
Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301, 1311 (11th Cir. 2002).
12. Smoter, supra note 4, at 244–48.
13. CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV., MEDICARE FRAUD & ABUSE:
PREVENT, DETECT, REPORT 4 (2019), https://www.cms.gov/outreach-andeducation/medicare-learning-network-MLN/MLNproducts/downloads/fraudabuse-MLN4649244.pdf [https://perma.cc/P3QJ-KRRG].
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patient suffering physically and emotionally, in addition to
taxpayers suffering monetarily.
For those reasons, it is in the best interest of the government,
taxpayers, and healthcare consumers to allow credible qui tam
claims to survive, at least through the discovery phase. After
studying both the most stringent and the most lenient jurisdictions,
this Article will suggest a solution to the circuit split. This solution
offers an alternative means for resolving qui tam claims. That
solution would take the form of an amendment to the FCA that
would allow for administrative organizations to step in where the
government decides not to pursue a qui tam claim or where a court
dismisses a qui tam claim before it can be fully heard. Such an
approach would better protect innocent healthcare organizations
and providers from unnecessary litigation while bringing entities
engaged in fraudulent billing practices to task for their unlawful
conduct.
Part I of this Article will lay out the law of the FCA, qui tam
actions, and relevant provisions of the FRCP. Part II will provide
a discussion of how the current law poses problems of pleading
fraud with particularity for qui tam relators with representative
examples from both strict and lenient circuits. Part III will discuss
solutions that scholars have put forth to resolve the problem and
advance this author’s alternative solution. Finally, this Article will
conclude by providing a summary of this important and timely
problem.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. The False Claims Act
For the government to successfully recoup funding from a
healthcare organization or provider, it must find evidence that the
Examples of
provider or organization violated the FCA. 14
violations include billing for services that a patient did not receive
or overbilling for services that were provided, but not to the degree
of accuracy as stated in the claim. 15
14. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2012).
15. CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV., supra note 13, at 7; see Michael
W. Youtt et al., False Claims Act Actions–The Developing Case Law Regarding
if and When Opinions of Medical Necessity Can Be Fraudulent, 27 HEALTH
LAW., Apr. 2015, at 36, 36.
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The first category of claims that the FCA covers are “factually
false” claims, which impose liability on “any person who . . .
knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent
claim for payment or approval.” 16 The FCA defines “knowing” and
“knowingly,” in respect to a person with information, as “[one who]
(i) has actual knowledge of the information; (ii) acts in deliberate
ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or (iii) acts in
reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information” and
“require[s] no proof of specific intent to defraud.” 17 It is important
to recognize the wide spectrum of knowledge that qualifies under
the statute, from actual knowledge to a reckless disregard for the
truth, or even conscious avoidance of the truth. Additionally, intent
to defraud is not required, which allows for significantly more
claims than if the statute included a scienter element. Section
3729(a)(1)(A) is useful in litigation involving providers “padding”
their bills with services that they never rendered, since the action
need be predicated only on the actual submission of these “factually
false” claims.
The second category of claims that the FCA covers are “legally
false” claims.18 The statute imposes liability on “any person who
. . . knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false
record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.” 19 The
FCA defines “material” as “having a natural tendency to influence,
or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or
property.” 20 This section of the legislation is illustrated in United
States ex. rel. Mikes v. Straus, where a pulmonologist pursued a
claim against a physician practice for failing to calibrate a piece of
machinery, rendering their tests so unreliable as to be “false.” 21
These “legally false” claims are common in the healthcare industry.

16. § 3729(a)(1)(A); see also United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg’l
Health Ctr., Inc., 543 F.3d 1211, 1217 (10th Cir. 2008) (“In a run-of-the mill
‘factually false’ case, proving falsehood is relatively straightforward: A relator
must generally show that the government payee has submitted ‘an incorrect
description of goods or services provided or a request for reimbursement for
goods or services never provided.’”).
17. § 3729(b)(1).
18. Conner, 543 F.3d at 1217.
19. § 3729(a)(1)(B).
20. § 3729(b)(4).
21. 274 F.3d 687, 692–93 (2d Cir. 2001).
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Lastly, the statute provides for additional damages when one
“knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or
decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the
Government.” 22 That occurs when providers or organizations
discover that they have incorrectly or mistakenly billed CMS and
do not initiate a refund process back to the government in a prompt
manner. If a provider is found liable, the statute allows the
government to recover a civil penalty plus treble damages for the
loss which the government sustained as a result of the provider’s
actions.23 That portion of the statute was reinforced as the “reverse
false claims act” provision within the Fraud Enforcement and
Recovery Act of 2009. 24 Additionally, the passage of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act in 2010 set parameters to
ensure that any falsely billed claims, upon identification, were to be
returned within sixty days of discovery of the overpayment.25
B. Qui Tam Actions
While the United States government has significant resources,
its dependence on private citizens to effectively police corporations
is demonstrated in section 3730, entitled “Civil Actions for False
Claims.” To assist in gauging the vast scope of these claims, the
Department of Justice reported that recovery from qui tam actions
related to healthcare under the FCA in 2018 amounted to over $2.1
billion of the $2.8 billion collected for all FCA claims. 26 Of that
amount, relators earned approximately $301 million in 645 qui tam
actions.27
Qui tam relators are often referred to as “whistleblowers,” as
the information that they assert and provide to the government as
the basis of their claims often comes from their relationship with a
former or current employer. 28 The statute permits a relator to
bring a civil action for a violation of the FCA in his or her name and
22. § 3729(a)(1)(G).
23. Id.
24. Youtt et al., supra note 15, at 36.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7k(d)(2) (2012).
26. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 1.
27. Id.
28. Brianna Bloodgood, Comment, Particularity Discovery in Qui Tam
Actions: A Middle Ground Approach to Pleading Fraud in the Health Care
Sector, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1435, 1439 (2017).

2020]

FALSE CLAIMS ACT

21

on behalf of the government. 29 The relator’s action is filed in
camera with the court and sealed for at least sixty days to allow the
government adequate time to review the claim. 30 The government
may decide to take the case and formally prosecute, utilizing its own
resources to pursue the claim. 31 If the government decides to not
take up the case and does not recommend dismissal to the court,
the relator is free to pursue the claim using his or her own resources
(funding, attorney guidance, etc.). 32
The monetary motives for relators seeing successful claims
through to judgment cannot be ignored. Under section 3730(d),
depending on the relator’s status—ranging from mere informant to
a wrongdoer who has turned himself over to the authorities—
relators stand to gain between ten and twenty-five percent of the
total damages recouped by the government. As the FCA authorizes
penalties per claim in the amount of “not less than $5,000 and not
more than $10,000 . . . plus 3 times the amount of damages which
the government sustains because of the act of that person,” it is
apparent why qui tam lawsuits are a popular means of ferreting out
fraud. 33 Compensation for risk is also appropriate when a relator’s
claim is pursued either by the government or the relator, especially
when the relator is a current employee. 34 There are protections for
“whistleblowers” as outlined in section 3730(h), providing for
additional compensation for lost wages and damages if the
whistleblower lost his or her job or suffered discrimination at his or
her employment site.
C. Pleading Standards Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure
At the complaint stage, most civil claims need only comply with
FRCP Rule 8(a) which states that the complainant must assert “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

29. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) (2012).
30. § 3730(b)(2).
31. § 3730(b)(4)(A).
32. § 3730(b)(1), (b)(4)(B).
33. § 3729(a)(1)(G).
34. Sean Elameto, Guarding the Guardians: Accountability in Qui Tam
Litigation Under the Civil False Claims Act, 41 PUB. CONT. L.J. 813, 818–19
(2012).
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entitled to relief.” 35 In federal courts, the scope of Rule 8(a) has
been further defined by the Supreme Court’s landmark decisions in
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal. Twombly
dealt with potential collusion in the telecommunications industry
in a claim brought by subscribers to telecommunications services. 36
Effectively, the Supreme Court stated that all of the details of the
claim need not be known at the time of pleading, but enough facts
must be present so that it is “plausible” that the fraudulent conduct
could have occurred. 37 Thus, Twombly established the plausibility
standard of pleading.38
Further elucidating the meaning of “plausibility,” the Supreme
Court again took up this issue in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, in the context of
the deprivation of constitutional liberties for a prisoner in the
aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.39 The
Supreme Court’s ruling in Iqbal stated that “[w]hile legal
conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must
be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded
factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to
relief.” 40
When pleading a fraud-related claim under the FCA,
complainants must also comply with the heightened pleading
requirements articulated in FRCP Rule 9. Specifically, Rule 9(b)
states, in relevant part, that: “[i]n alleging fraud or mistake, a party
must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud
or mistake.” 41 Accordingly, a relator must comply with pleading
requirements of both Rules 8 and 9. However, this raises the
question of just how much “particularity” is necessary at the
pleading stage. Further complicating this issue, the circuits are
split on interpreting “particularity” as it relates to qui tam
litigation in healthcare.
Thus, when a relator brings a qui tam action under the FCA,
it is not enough to assert fraud generally, but rather the complaint
35. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
36. 550 U.S. 544, 550–51 (2007).
37. Id. at 556.
38. Id. at 544.
39. 556 U.S. 662, 666 (2009).
40. Id. at 679.
41. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
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must contain plausible factual assertions that support the legal
allegations. Regardless of whether the pleading standards have
been met in an FCA qui tam action, the likelihood of the complaint
withstanding a motion to dismiss depends largely upon the circuit
in which the action was filed.
II. THE PROBLEM OF QUI TAM PLEADING WITH PARTICULARITY

Each circuit court has chosen either a strict or lenient standard
when deciding whether to allow qui tam relator claims to proceed
to discovery, leading to widely varied and inconsistent results. 42
For qui tam relators, the strict standard poses a unique challenge
in their attempts to have their cases heard before a court. 43 The
Supreme Court has denied writs of certiorari to resolve this circuit
split. Consequently, it is important to understand the different
approaches that circuit courts use in deciding these difficult
cases. 44
A. Circuit Courts that Apply Stringent Rule 9(b) Pleading
Standards
Circuits that strictly apply the Rule 9(b) standard 45 maintain
that the Rule “require[s] a relator’s complaint to identify
representative samples of the allegedly false claims.” 46 The
rationale motivating this strict approach is that it protects the
defendant’s reputation in the market against vexatious claims and
deters qui tam relators from making frivolous claims if they know
there is little chance of success. 47 Additionally, some argue that
“[m]eritless FCA suits impose significant financial burdens on the
taxpayer by wasting the [Department of Justice]’s investigative
resources and increasing the costs of government programs and
contracts.” 48 Merely stating that a relator knows of a scheme or
fraud without more detailed information will most likely not
42. Smoter, supra note 4, at 237.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See cases cited supra notes 9–11.
46. See Michael Lockman, Comment, In Defense of a Strict Pleading
Standard for False Claims Act Whistleblowers, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1559, 1559–
60 (2015).
47. Id. at 1566.
48. Id. at 1567.
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survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion filed by the defendant in those
circuits that take a stricter approach to Rule 9(b) pleading
standards. 49
In one of the most cited cases on this topic, United States ex rel.
Clausen v. Laboratory Corp. of America, the Eleventh Circuit
upheld the district court’s opinion that the relator did not plead
enough facts with particularity to allow the claim to pass to the
discovery phase.50 The relator, Jeffrey Clausen, was not an
employee of the defendant Laboratory Corporation of America, Inc.
(LabCorp), but “identified himself as a current competitor” in the
laboratory industry.51 Clausen alleged in his complaint that
LabCorp, which provided diagnostic services to patients residing in
long-term care facilities, was fraudulently billing Medicare. 52 To
support his allegations, he stated that he had knowledge of six
different schemes in which LabCorp was receiving funds from
Medicare that were inappropriate, including: standing orders for
laboratory tests that were not ordered by physicians; random draws
for laboratory tests without a physician’s order; unbundling of blood
testing to allow for duplicative billing; charging multiple times for
travel to long-term care facilities where multiple patients were seen
on the same service date; and for patients with multiple comorbidities, charging for the same test multiple times
corresponding to each chronic condition, despite the test only being
performed once. 53 Clausen filed an initial complaint, followed by
two amended complaints, both of which were dismissed by the
district court, thus prompting Clausen to appeal to the Eleventh
Circuit. 54
The initial complaint failed to “identify any [long-term care
facilities] by name, include any documentary exhibits or explain the
origin of its information,” and eventually, after conducting its own
investigation, the government “declined to intervene.” 55 Clausen
proceeded to file his first amended complaint, which included
further details, such as information regarding conversations
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See id. at 1570.
290 F.3d 1301, 1302 (11th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1302–03.
Id.
Id. at 1303.
Id. at 1302.
Id. at 1303–04.
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between Clausen and LabCorp employees (identified by specific
names) regarding LabCorp policies, codes that would have been
used falsely by LabCorp to bill the government, and the medical
history of three patients in two named facilities. 56 Nevertheless,
the district court dismissed count one of the complaint, finding that
Clausen failed to meet the pleading standard under Rule 9(b), thus
requiring him to file a second amended complaint. 57 Clausen’s
second amended complaint included more detailed information
concerning the three patients identified in the first amended
complaint and a blank claim form that was routinely used to bill
the government for services rendered to patients. 58 The district
court subsequently granted LabCorp’s second motion to dismiss,
stating that Clausen’s amended complaint “‘suffer[ed] from the
same defect as the [First] Amended Complaint’ in that it did not
‘identif[y] a single fraudulent claim by date filed, amount or claim
number that was actually submitted to the government.’” 59
The Eleventh Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court’s
decision to dismiss Clausen’s complaint. 60 The court explained
that, in order to allow the claim to pass through to the discovery
phase, a pleading must contain facts alleging statements or
documents that were made in pursuit of the fraud, the time and
place of those statements, the person or persons responsible for
making the statements or composing the documents, the manner in
which the statements or documents misled the government to
induce payment, and what the defendants gained by making the
false statements. 61 The court further stated that “Clausen merely
offer[ed] conclusory statements, and [did] not adequately allege
when—or even if—the schemes were brought to fruition.”62 Hence,
the Eleventh Circuit took a firm stance regarding pleading
healthcare fraud with particularity, setting a high bar for qui tam
relators.
56. Id. at 1304.
57. Id. at 1305.
58. Id. at 1305–06, 1306 n.10.
59. Id. at 1306–07.
60. Id. at 1315.
61. See id. at 1310 (citing Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194,
1202 (11th Cir. 2001) and United States ex rel. Cooper v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Fla., 19 F.3d 562, 567–68 (11th Cir. 1994)).
62. Clausen, 290 F.3d at 1312.
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The Fourth Circuit reached a similar result in United States
ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharmacies North America, Inc. There,
Noah Nathan, a sales manager for the pharmaceutical company
Takeda Pharmaceuticals (Takeda), brought a qui tam action under
the FCA.63 Nathan provided three amended complaints pursuant
to the court’s requests which alleged that Takeda employed
marketing tactics that ultimately led to the government paying for
prescriptions that were inappropriately prescribed to patients. 64
Nathan asserted that sales representatives were encouraged to
promote a newly approved gastrointestinal drug, Kapidex, to
physicians who did not regularly prescribe this type of drug, thus
encouraging “off-label” use that could not be reimbursed. 65 He also
asserted that sales representatives only provided samples of the
sixty milligram tablet of Kapidex to physicians, despite the fact that
the thirty milligram tablet was FDA-approved for a more common
condition, and without considering whether the thirty milligram
tablet was better suited to each physician’s needs.66 In short,
Nathan alleged that Takeda effectively induced the government to
pay for prescription claims that were technically not reimbursable
in violation of the FCA.67
The district court dismissed Nathan’s complaint in response to
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion filed by Takeda. 68 The Fourth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s ruling, stating that “when a defendant’s
actions, as alleged and as reasonably inferred from the allegations,
could have led, but need not necessarily have led, to the submission
of false claims, a relator must allege with particularity that specific
false claims actually were presented to the government for
payment.” 69 While the suit seemed plausible on its face (which
would allow the suit to meet the Rule 8(a) standard), the court
mentioned various ways in which the relator’s argument failed to
meet the heightened Rule 9(b) standard, namely that even though
Nathan had supplied the court with numbers of prescriptions
written or filled, he did not provide the diagnoses associated with
63. 707 F.3d 451, 453 (4th Cir. 2013).
64. See id. at 454.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See id.
68. Id. at 453.
69. Id. at 457.
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each prescription, which was required to validate the doses.70 The
court was unwilling to allow the claim to proceed to discovery based
on inferences “draw[n] . . . from general facts.” 71
Both the Clausen and Nathan opinions led to the dismissal of
qui tam actions and are used to illustrate how some courts apply a
strict standard to Rule 9(b) pleadings.
B. Circuit Courts that Apply Lenient Rule 9(b) Pleading
Standards
On the other side of the split, courts allow a more lenient
application of the Rule 9(b) standard. These circuits require
pleading fraud with particularity without specific details, which
can be accomplished when the pleading is supported by “reliable
indicia” that bolsters the inference that a healthcare provider
supplied false claims to the government. 72 This standard is flexible
enough to allow claims to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion in order to
accomplish the true purpose of the FCA—capture providers that are
defrauding the government. Knowledge of the scheme, as well as
the indicia of reliability, allows relators to pursue and recoup
funding that was incorrectly and fraudulently paid to healthcare
organizations or providers not deserving of the reimbursement.
In Foglia v. Renal Ventures Management, LLC, the Third
Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of a Rule
12(b)(6)motion.73 In that case, Thomas Foglia, a registered nurse
at Renal Ventures from 2007 to 2008, alleged that Renal Ventures
was not in compliance with quality regulations and was charging
Medicare inappropriately as a result. 74 The complaint centered
around the use of the drug Zemplar, which at the time was available
in three different vial sizes. 75 Renal Ventures exclusively used the
5 mcg single-use vials for its patients with chronic kidney disease. 76
When using the 5 mcg vials, most patients did not require the full
dose in the vial, leaving the remaining product to be discarded at
70. See id. at 459–60.
71. Id. at 460.
72. E.g., United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 190
(5th Cir. 2009).
73. 754 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 2014).
74. See id. at 155.
75. Id. at 157.
76. Id.
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the directive of the manufacturer. 77 Even though the whole vial
was not used, Renal Ventures nevertheless billed Medicare for the
whole vial. 78 If the unused portion of the drug was discarded, this
practice would have fallen within the acceptable use standards for
the medication. 79 However, Foglia alleged that the unused product
was not discarded, but rather it was “harvested” for other
patients—leading Renal Ventures to charge Medicare for the full
vial—while actually only using portions and taking advantage of
the remainder. 80 Foglia supported these allegations with his
testimony as well as with medication logs that showed, given
patient volume, approximately fifty vials should have been used
each day (with the overage discarded), but instead only twenty-nine
to thirty-five vials were being used each day. 81 Even though the
district court found that this information did not comply with the
particularity standards required by Rule 9(b), the Third Circuit
stated that it would follow the approach used by the First, Fifth,
and Ninth Circuits; that is, “it is sufficient for a plaintiff to allege
‘particular details of a scheme to submit false claims paired with
reliable indicia that lead to a strong inference that claims were
actually submitted.’” 82 On these grounds, the court reasoned that
there were enough facts to allow the case to proceed to discovery,
showing a clear divergence from those circuits that apply a more
stringent standard. 83
The Fifth Circuit took a similar approach in United States ex
rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti. 84 Dr. Grubbs, a psychiatrist, alleged
that the Chairman of the Medical Staff of the hospital’s Psychiatric
Subsection and several other doctors were involved in a scheme to
defraud Medicare. 85 The alleged fraud arose when the doctors
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. Id. The Department of Health and Human Services did allow for
multiple use of vials, but only under certain conditions that Renal Ventures
was not meeting. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 158.
82. Id. at 156–157 (citing Ebeid ex rel. United States v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d
993, 998–99 (9th Cir. 2010) and United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti,
565 F.3d 180, 190 (5th Cir. 2009)).
83. See id. at 158.
84. 565 F.3d 180, 190 (5th Cir. 2009).
85. Id.
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would record “face-to-face physician visits that had not occurred
and that were based solely on information obtained through
nursing contacts with the patients.” 86 Upon reporting that practice
to the general hospital administrator, Dr. Grubbs was dismissed
and the alleged fraudulent billing practices continued.87 Dr.
Grubbs filed a qui tam action in which he asserted at least one
distinct false claim for each physician involved in the fraud. 88 The
district court held that the evidence of fraud presented by Dr.
Grubbs was insufficient to satisfy the particularity requirement set
forth under Rule 9(b). 89
The Fifth Circuit reversed, allowing Dr. Grubbs to advance his
suit against the hospital and doctors involved. The court recognized
the traditional judicial construct that a relator’s pleading must
include “the time, place, and contents of the false representation[],
as well as the identity of the person making the misrepresentation
and what that person obtained thereby.” 90 However, the court also
acknowledged that “Rule 9(b)’s ultimate meaning is contextspecific.” 91 Ultimately, the court concluded that strict adherence to
the traditional construct would make it exceedingly difficult for a
Rule 9(b) pleading to move forward, which would be contrary to the
spirit of the FCA. 92
The Fifth Circuit, through Grubbs, adopted a flexible pleading
standard under Rule 9(b), stating that “a relator’s complaint, if it
cannot allege the details of an actually submitted false claim, may
nevertheless survive by alleging particular details of a scheme to
submit false claims paired with reliable indicia that lead to a strong
inference that claims were actually submitted.” 93 Under this
approach, Dr. Grubbs’s claims against the doctors were permitted
to move forward, but the claim against the hospital was dismissed
because the billing originated from the doctors and the hospital
86. Id. at 184.
87. See id.
88. Id. at 184–85.
89. See id.
90. Id. at 188. (quoting United States ex rel. Russell v. Epic Healthcare
Mgmt. Grp., 193 F.3d 304, 308 (5th Cir. 1999)).
91. Id. (quoting Williams v. WMX Techs., Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 178 (5th Cir.
1997)).
92. Id. at 190.
93. Id.
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lacked the requisite intent for liability under the FCA.94 Most
importantly, the court in Grubbs recognized that allowing claims to
move forward both permits qui tam relators to access, through
discovery, the particular information required to adequately plead
their claims (i.e., billing records, clinical records, etc.), while
protecting organizations and providers from frivolous litigation by
scrutinizing each relator claim to ensure plausibility. 95
A similar scenario on a much grander scale occurred in the oftcited Eighth Circuit case, United States ex rel. Thayer v. Planned
Parenthood of the Heartland. 96 Susan Thayer was a center
manager at Planned Parenthood’s Storm Lake, Iowa location from
1991 to 2008, and served as a center manager for a second location
in Iowa for four years during this time. 97 Thayer alleged that
Planned Parenthood (operating seventeen clinics in Iowa) engaged
in the following schemes: obtaining reimbursement from Medicaid
for contraceptives that were prescribed without a necessary
examination or were not actually received by patients; obtaining
prohibited reimbursements based on federal law for abortion
services; filing claims for services that had already been paid for by
philanthropic funding; and “upcoding” for services. 98 While the
district court dismissed Thayer’s claim for failure to meet the Rule
9(b) standard, the Eighth Circuit reversed. 99
The Eighth Circuit looked to both the allegations that Thayer
brought in her claim and the base of knowledge that she acquired
as an employee and manager during her lengthy tenure with
Planned Parenthood.100 The court found that Thayer had satisfied
the heightened pleading requirement because she identified the
names of Planned Parenthood employees who directed her
participation in these schemes, the time period during which the
schemes were carried out (two years), the actual clinics that

94. Id. at 191–92.
95. See id. at 191.
96. 765 F.3d 914 (8th Cir. 2014).
97. Id. at 915.
98. Id. at 915–16. “Upcoding” is a process by which a medical facility
“file[s] claims for more expensive services than were actually performed.” Id.
at 916.
99. Id. at 915.
100. See id. at 917, 919.
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participated in the billing schemes, and the methods used to
achieve the object of the schemes.101
In its discussion, the court noted that the Eighth Circuit does
not require a representative sample approach whereby a relator
must cite specific instances of fraud within his or her complaint. 102
Instead, the court stated that “to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s particularity
requirement, ‘the complaint must plead such facts as the time,
place, and content of the defendant’s false representations, as well
as the details of the defendant’s fraudulent acts, including when the
acts occurred, who engaged in them, and what was obtained as a
result.’” 103 Given Thayer’s long tenure with Planned Parenthood,
access to and management of the billing and claims system, and
intimate knowledge of the inner workings of the organization, her
complaint satisfied the court’s standard for particularity. 104
III. SOLUTIONS TO THE CIRCUIT SPLIT

Pleading fraud with particularity to satisfy Rule 9(b) in
relation to the FCA is a subject that has been discussed at length
in several law journal articles and the cases themselves.105 The
Supreme Court has denied at least three writs of certiorari from
plaintiffs attempting to resolve the confusion regarding what, in
fact, is a sufficiently well-pleaded complaint from a qui tam relator
in the healthcare forum. 106 There are three approaches of note that
have been advanced but have not yet been adopted by the courts.
The first approach proposes that when two medical professionals
disagree on the medically appropriate course of treatment, there
cannot be a false claim. 107 Disagreement about care that yields a
claim billed to CMS is not a sufficient basis for a qui tam suit so
long as both courses of treatment are reasonable in relation to what
101. Id. at 919.
102. See id. at 918 (quoting United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565
F.3d 180, 190 (5th Cir. 2009)).
103. Id. at 916–17 (quoting United States ex rel. Joshi v. St. Luke’s Hospital,
Inc., 441 F.3d 552, 556 (8th Cir. 2006)).
104. See id. at 917.
105. See generally Grubbs, 565 F.3d 180; United States ex rel. Clausen v.
Lab. Corp. of Am., 290 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2002); Bloodgood, supra note 28;
Smoter, supra note 4.
106. Lockman, supra note 46, at 1560.
107. Youtt et al., supra note 15, at 43.
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is in the best interest of the patient. 108 The second approach
advances a more moderate pleading standard rather than the
inflexible approach applied by courts such as the Eleventh
Circuit. 109 The last approach advocates for relators to have the
opportunity for discovery prior to advancing their claim, which
would allow them to meet the particularity pleading standard. 110
Recognizing the limitations inherent in these approaches, this
Article will propose a solution that diverts from a purely judicial
remedy handled strictly within the courts. The proposal includes
the usage of administrative government agencies to pursue qui tam
actions in lieu of the court system, thus requiring a change to the
FCA.
A. Existing Proposed Solutions
For attorney-scholars Robison, Thomas, and Youtt, one of the
problems giving rise to the circuit split relates to claims regarding
differing opinions of medical necessity; different circuits appear to
have contradictory understandings of when pleadings are sufficient
to demonstrate lack of medical necessity. 111 In their view, any
claim that does not fall into the category of medical necessity—that
is, billing patients for services they do not need—should remain
subject to the FCA. 112 However, depending on provider preference,
knowledge, and skill, as well as patient autonomy, what is
considered medically necessary may vary. 113 For example, two
physicians reasonably disagreeing on a course of treatment does not
necessarily render that treatment objectively false in violation of
the FCA.114 Courts agree that cases involving claims arising from
incorrect or negligent medical acts are not actionable under the
FCA.115 In those instances, a physician who supported a course of
treatment that was actually wrong for the patient or carried out the
treatment negligently is not violating the FCA so long as the
108. See id. at 38 (quoting United States ex rel. Hockett v. Columbia/HCA,
498 F. Supp. 2d 25, 65, n. 29 (D.D.C. 2007)).
109. See Smoter, supra note 4, at 236–37.
110. Bloodgood, supra note 28, at 1435–36.
111. See Youtt et al., supra note 15, at 40.
112. See id. at 37.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 38.
115. See id.
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provider acted with the reasonable belief that the service was
necessary, and not in a manner that amounts to knowingly
defrauding the government. 116 Thus, as long as a provider does not
knowingly defraud the government, the provider does not violate
the FCA where reasonable medical minds may differ over the
proposed course of treatment. 117
While that is a well-reasoned suggestion for courts evaluating
FCA claims, it only addresses one type of claim under the FCA. The
unnecessary treatment or services rendered to a patient is only one
of the potential ways a provider could defraud the government.
Those types of claims are not part of a greater scheme to defraud
the government such as the scheme in Foglia, where there was clear
abuse of billing for medications. 118 They address only cases where
there is a difference of opinion, not a difference in treatment
standards, which will not cover the majority of FCA claims.
The second argument that has been advanced is one that is
critical of the “representative samples” approach, where a qui tam
relator provides a CMS claim, or evidence of a CMS claim
submission, that the court can use to substantiate the pleadings. 119
Supporters of this approach assert that those relators who file in
districts that strictly adhere to the representative sample approach
may be deprived of their day in court, as they may not have access
to the documents that would provide the representative sample
needed for the court to find enough particularity in the
complaint. 120 Additionally, for those qui tam relators who do have
evidence on hand, a more flexible approach will not be detrimental
to their case.121 In lieu of the representative samples approach,
this theory mimics the approach that the more lenient circuits have
adopted to decide whether a qui tam complaint meets the Rule 9(b)
threshold.122 Proponent of this approach assert that “[w]hen
116. See id.; see also Luckey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., F. Supp. 2d 1034,
1047 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (“The requisite intent [under the FCA] is the knowing
presentation of what is known to be false, as opposed to innocent mistakes or
mere negligence.”).
117. See Youtt et al., supra note 15, at 38.
118. Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2014).
119. See Lockman, supra, note 46, at 1559-60.
120. See Smoter, supra note 4, at 245.
121. See id.
122. Id. at 259.
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evaluating a relator’s complaint, every court should consider
whether the relator sufficiently alleged: (1) details of the overall
fraudulent scheme and (2) indicia of reliability.” 123 Because this
method has already been adopted by the lenient circuit courts, 124 it
does nothing to resolve the existing circuit split.
A final proposed solution—which perhaps may be the least
disruptive—is to set a pleading standard that allows for a limited,
court-controlled discovery process after the filing of a relator
complaint. 125 This solution would allow a limited pretrial discovery
period conducted under court-imposed parameters giving relators
access to information that could substantiate their claims, and at
the same time, control court and defendant costs. 126 Courts could
ensure that patient privacy is secure by placing requested records
under seal and controlling the number of records reviewed. 127
Although this solution is workable, it would still not provide the
government with a robust ability to recoup funds fraudulently paid
and it would only offer a solution for a portion of healthcare fraud
cases. As such, this author proffers the solution below.
B. Proposed Solution
After duly considering the case law and opinions of other
authors, this Article suggests that a change in legislation is needed.
As proposed, new FCA legislation would allow administrative
agencies, such as CMS or healthcare fraud task forces, to work with
a qui tam relator should the court decide that the relator has not
pleaded fraud with sufficient particularity. Under the FCA, the
government currently can
elect to pursue its claim through any alternate remedy
available to the Government, including any administrative
proceeding to determine a civil money penalty . . . . [T]he
person initiating the action shall have the same rights in
123. Id.
124. See id. at 244.
125. Bloodgood, supra note 28, at 1464 (“Provided that judges can be
persuaded that the peculiarities of fraud in the health care sector warrant an
alternative framework for decisionmaking during the pre-trial phase,
particularity discovery designed to help a qui tam plaintiff satisfy a stricter
reading of Rule 9(b) is a feasible middle ground to resolve the circuit split.”).
126. Id. at 1456–58.
127. See id.
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such a proceeding as such a person would have had if the
action had continued under [section 3730]. 128
While it may seem that the law already covers this proposed
solution, there is a complication in the nexus between the FCA and
the qui tam statute—administrative agencies cannot enforce the
FCA:
The FCA is a litigation statute, which is distinct from the
other fraud and abuse statutes such as the Civil Monetary
Penalties Law in two important ways: (1) FCA cases will
always be prosecuted in federal court, where the express
language of a statute will be strictly construed in
accordance with the rules of civil procedure; and (2) unlike
the four other major Medicare fraud and abuse statutes
(Stark Law, the Anti-Kickback Statute, Civil Monetary
Penalties Law (CMPL), and the Exclusionary Statute),
Congress did not “enable” the so-called alphabet agencies
(e.g., the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS), Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS),
DOJ, and the OIG) to adopt U.S. Code of Federal
Regulations concerning the FCA . . . . Interpretation of the
elements of the FCA, if any, must come from the courts, or
amendments to the Act by Congress. 129
Thus, even though under section 3730 relators should be able to
pursue their claims in the administrative arena, the statute under
which they are bringing their claims prohibits them from doing so
by making the judicial system the exclusive means of resolving such
disputes.
Amending the FCA would be a great departure from the
current state of the law. However, given the rampant amount of
fraud throughout our healthcare system, it is imperative that tax
dollars not go to waste in paying providers for fraudulent CMS
claims. While the proposed solution may invite additional claims,
it would allow administrative agencies to pursue such suits, and the
recoupment of funds by the government cannot be overlooked. This
Article’s proposed solution would work well in cases such as
Clausen and Nathan where the claims likely would have survived
128.
129.

31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2012).
Merritt & Rose, supra note 3, at 63.
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in a more lenient circuit and potentially resulted in millions of
dollars returned to the government.
While CMS and other administrative agencies have limited
resources in their ability to find fraud, their discretion in pursuing
actions against those committing fraud would be much more robust
under the proposed solution. By allowing relators to bring their
concerns to the courts, or in the alternative, an administrative
agency that is designed to safeguard the integrity of our healthcare
system, taxpayers and patients both stand to benefit.
CONCLUSION

Unfortunately, healthcare fraud is rampant throughout the
United States healthcare system. Hospitals, pharmaceutical
companies, medical supply companies, medical technology
companies, and even doctors and nurses have a valid interest in
maintaining their revenue and profit streams. Nevertheless,
companies and providers that cross the line from legitimate care to
fraudulent billing should be held accountable for their actions. As
the Supreme Court has declined to resolve the discord among the
circuits concerning the appropriate pleading standard for alleged
healthcare fraud under the FCA, a change is necessary to ensure
that relators have alternative means to rectify the injustice that
they witness in the system.
An extrajudicial process would provide such an alternative
avenue for redress in the event that a court declines to review a
relator’s claim for failure to plead with particularity pursuant to
Rule 9(b). This would maximize recoupment of government funds
thus benefitting all interested parties.

